2014. vol. 11. No. 4

The classic problem of the unity of intellect and affect (L.Vygotsky) is being reinterpreted in the new area emerging during the last decade — that is, the psychology of uncertainty. The topics developed quite autonomously (academic intelligence, emotional intelligence, personal qualities of tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty, risk tolerance, rationality, moral consciousness of the person, etc.) have been inextricably linked within the study of the regulation of the personal choice. The fact that the common hallmark of the psychological regulation of choice, or decision-making, is the need to overcome uncertainty, not only brought on by situational characteristics, but also the subjective uncertainty that is associated with the properties of the person (his systems of knowledge, personal values, individual and psychological characteristics). In foreign psychological studies the concepts of decision-making and choice function in the form of two main terms 1. And in one and the same book name one term can be used in the title, while the other is preferably used (Hasti, Dawes, 2010). In experimental work the understanding of the situation of choice as a closed task as opposed to open problems (which are better known in the psychology of thinking) is an important aspect. Uncertainty situations require from the person to resolve them through his own efforts, involving both mental activity and personal contribution. The construction of an image of the situation and extending the definition of objectives and alternatives, forecasting and assessment of the impact, the choice itself (from given or constructed by the man himself alternatives) — all these stages and processes mediating decision-making assume the subject relying on its full intellectual and personal potential, in which the cognitive and personal aspects may be only relatively determined. Humans predict not only the development of the situation as a result of their choice of an alternative, but also the personal cost of the decision taken, including the assessment “who I become as a result of this choice of mine.” Personality does not only reflect on but it also experiences the situation of choice. Even if all the alternatives are known the choice criteria are given, it remains unknown what decision will be taken by a particular person, what criterion will dominate in the hierarchy of possible subjective justifications of choice. In psychology there are cognitive and behavioral. And each of them has contributed to revealing of the regulatory role of various processes (from thinking to personal self-determination). Our research group set a goal to return to the idea of an integrated regulation of choice. A multiple multi-level model of regulation human decisions in uncertainty conditions was formulated and the hypothesis of the openness of dynamic regulatory systems of choice was substantiated, which implies both a dynamic hierarchization of processes, mediating the choice and an opportunity to enter the dominating level of any process (of both cognitive and personal regulation). The selection of articles offered to the reader is united by a certain aspect of considering this unity — the connection of the personal attitude to uncertainty and emotional intelligence, on the one hand, and the choice preferences, on the other. Apart from the community of psychodiagnostic techniques the methodological paradigm involved the use of verbal tasks and opportunities of prompts. In one case, possible prompts could be regarded as using supra-individual knowledge. The subject could receive them within a computerized procedure of choice in verbal tasks involving or not involving the use of specialized knowledge. This aspect is represented in the article by T.Kornilova. In addition to extending of the field of awareness the procedure included changes in decision-making positions “for oneself” and “for another” (for other people). The study showed that the experimental factor significantly affected the detected connection of tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty, emotional intelligence and the time of reflection in a situation of choice. In another study presented in the article by E.Krasnov and M.Chumakova, the prompt looked like a picturesque sweep of the emotional context of the situation development. In this paper a new approach to the procedure of analyzing the prompts use was used. The approach emphasized the regulatory aspect of the emotional context account in the personal choice, leading or not leading to the resolution of a given situation of uncertainty. Firstly, the Method of Emotional Prompt (MEP) combines the analysis of free personal choices and the orientation on the emotional context of the situation after it is revealed in the picture, demonstrating its evolution (after the planned alternative). Secondly, the picture prompts remove the problem of identifying emotions as they are clearly expressed; i.e. the emphasis is on identifying the decision point when after receiving a prompt, the very account of emotional information is either involved or not involved in the regulation of decision-making. Thirdly, in the research scheme the diagnosed personality characteristics of tolerance or intolerance to uncertainty and emotional intelligence are considered in connection with the characteristics of the personal choice in the verbally given situations that, when a supposed alternative is specified, are revealed through the pictorial development of events. Here for the first time the results of the prompt impact are analyzed on the basis of construction of integrative indicators of choices. Such complexity of research procedures is justified because personal characteristics and choices in situations are directly connected only through one scale in the MSCEIT test. However, integrative indicators of decision-making allow estimating both the efficiency of emotional prompts and ecological validity of the tasks themselves in the MEP. The work of T.Kornilova and I.Chigrinova, also performed on the materials of the verbal tasks, considers connections or tolerance and intolerance to uncertainty and emotional intelligence to the levels of moral consciousness of the person. On the basis of specially designed tasks, half of which involved the use of emotional intelligence, and the other half — the Machiavellian use of another person (for one’s own purposes), or the rejection of manipulation, predictors of personal choice were identified. It was shown that the levels of moral development of personality are more significant predictors in situations of interpersonal interaction. Earlier the role of tolerance and intolerance to uncertainty as predictors of creativity was shown (Kornilova, 2010b); connections of self-assessment of intelligence as based on the implicit theories of intelligence and presenting the dialogic identity of the person were determined (Kornilova, Novikova, 2011). The article by E.Pavlova continued to consider connections of tolerance to uncertainty and creativity and self-esteem, measured both by a direct self-assessment method and by a questionnaire aimed at identifying the implicit theories of creativity. Tolerance to uncertainty was the predictor of scales that assess different aspects of implicit theories of creativity ( in the new questionnaire it was the implicit theories of creativity). The trust to intuition turned out to be associated both with this personal property and with the implicit theories of creativity. The articles show the picture of multiple and multilevel personal regulation of choices and productive (creative) decisions of a person specific to different samples and conditions, but in general, showing the link of the attitude to uncertainty in the functioning of a unified intellectual and personal potential of the person whose decisions are mediated by common sense.

(Footnote 1) I am not considering the German Entscheidungen and the English Decising as options translated into Russian as “solutions” and distinguishing the context of the choice of decisions with respect to the context of problem solving.

This article presents a study of the regulatory role of emotional intelligence in decision-making in real-life situations and of the functioning of intellectual and personal potential using Emotional Anticipation Method (EAM). Expert psychologists used quality analysis techniques to develop a typology of the content characteristics of choices on a sample of military instructors (N = 79).

It is important to note that our selective sample included professionals involved in actual professional activity, who are well aware of the consequences of using or ignoring emotional information in their professional activity. Characteristics of emotional intelligence (EI) and tolerance to ambiguity in the system of predictors of personal choice were considered. The hypothesis of discrepancy between the data obtained using objective measurements and EI questionnaires was confirmed. The results show difference between dispositional and situational contexts of inclusion of EI in the regulation of choices. For each task, we obtained proofs that subjects non-randomly selected one of the proposed alternatives and their choice was the closest to their personal solution. This allows us to consider alternatives designed as having high ecological validity. It was found that in the final answer, the use of illustrative tips led to an increase in the number of choices that minimise uncertainty in a given emotional context. Emotional intelligence serves as a prerequisite for effective use of illustrative tips. EAM procedure can be regarded as an indirect diagnostic tool for evaluation of certain aspects of emotional intelligence.

The paper summarizes the results of an empirical study of personality regulation of choice and decision-making in a sample of undergraduate students (total n=896). The study examined the interrelationships among different components of emotional intelligence, indices of the stages of moral development and acceptance/rejection of uncertainty, as well as readiness for risk, rationality and Machiavellianism. We used a set of verbal vignettes to obtain indices of decision making. The choice alternatives for the vignettes were designed to represent the outcomes where uncertainty was resolved vs. unresolved. In half of the vignettes, the choice alternatives were also focused on manipulating vs. not manipulating others, and in the other half on using vs. not using the emotional information provided by the vignette. We found that indices of moral development differentiated between different choices alternatives not only in situations where decision-making involved manipulating other people but also in situations that involved using emotional information.  Surprisingly, indices of the stages of moral development were stronger predictors of choice in situations involving other people than emotional intelligence. We also found that high (“Post-conventional”) levels of moral development are sometimes associated with the preference for the Machiavellian choice alternatives, suggesting that the role of values in decision can be conceptualized as dynamic.  «Tolerance» and «Intolerance for uncertainty» were also linked to choice variables, suggesting the necessity for including these traits in the comprehensive evaluation of the personality regulation of choice.

The article describes the study of the relationship between objectified indicators of creativity, its representation at the level of self-consciousness (in the form of direct self-evaluations and implicit theories of creativity) in the context of studies of the attitude toward uncertainty. A new tool to measure implicit theories of creativity, namely a Questionnaire of implicit theories of creativity (KIT) (N = 393), has been developed. Factor analysis and structural modelling were used to determine the factor structure of the questionnaire measuring four scales: "Originality" (manifestation of creativity in a familiar environment), "Intellectual and personal potential" (the use of components of the intellectual and personal potential), "Novelty" (manifestation of creativity in uncertain situations) and "Activity" (manifestation of creativity in the activity and communication).

Mechanisms of implicit theories of creativity and self-esteem as part of the intellectual and personal potential were explored on the sample of creative professionals (writers, composers and theatre and film directors, N = 52, all recognized by the community), which additionally allowed to introduce an external criterion of creativity. It was shown that at a conscious level, creativity is represented in the form of hierarchically linked self-evaluations and implicit theories, and the process of self-evaluation is based on objective indicators of creativity, while having implicit theories of creativity at its core. In recognized creative professionals, there is a connection between creativity and personality characteristics, such as "Tolerance and intolerance for uncertainty," "Trust for intuition", "Self-assessment of creativity", and objective measures of creativity; professional development in artistic professions is accompanied by the development of a more integrated system in which self-esteem appears as an integrative formation. The results obtained are considered as an argument in favor of the assumption that, in assessing own creativity, use of implicit theories of creativity as the basis of this self-esteem serves to reduce the level of uncertainty set by ambiguity of the criteria and permanent formation of the personality.

“Philosophy of psychiatry” is an interdisciplinary research domain spanning psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, and other sciences. The possibility of understanding and interpreting delirious statements is one of the key issues in this area. Different approaches to the interpretation of delirious utterances are analyzed, in particular, the position of K. Jaspers, who postulated the “limits of understanding” the mental illness, and the attempts to provide mechanisms for interpretation of the delirious content made in the contemporary “philosophy of psychiatry”. Several approaches to conceptualizing delirious propositions are presented, including the positions of G. Berrios, who proposes to consider them as empty statements, the ideas of B. Maher and M. Davies, who see delirious statements as reactions to abnormal experience, and the “rationalistic approach” by J. Campbell and L. Sass, which views them as expressions of disorder of the designation mechanism. Each of these positions is explored in the paper, and the resulting approaches to the limits of interpretation are shown. Clinical cases are presented that provide examples of analysis by means of exploring the changes in the “basic positions”, that is, the transformation of assumptions that form the basis of reality perception in persons with mental disorder. Also, the author discusses the implications of delirious statement interpretability of delirious statements for psychiatric practice and for future interdisciplinary study, in particular, the way it influences the contribution of different disciplines to the explanation of mental disorder.

We analyze the problem of the role of reflective processes in self-regulation and explain the diversity of existing opinions by introducing a model of reflective processes that differentiates their positive (systemic reflection) and negative varieties (quasi-reflection, introspection). The model was operationalized in a new instrument, 30-item Differential Test of Reflection (DTR) with scales of systemic reflection, introspection, and quasi-reflection. The paper describes 6 studies aimed at development and validation of the DTR. The structure of the instrument was established using confirmatory factor analysis in an Internet sample (N=3860) and cross-validated in a summer school participant sample (N=261). The scales demonstrate acceptable reliability (0.78 < α < 0.85); the two negative reflection scales are moderately correlated and show weak associations with the systemic reflection scale. All three reflection scales were positively associated with other existing reflection indicators. The systemic reflection scale showed weak to moderate positive correlations with measures of happiness, life satisfaction, openness to experience, emotional stability, and positive solitude. The introspection scale demonstrated moderate negative correlations with measures of happiness, life satisfaction, subjective vitality, meaning, hardiness, action orientation, and emotional stability, as well as positive ones with measures of loneliness and dependence on communication; the quasi-reflection scale showed weaker, but similar effects. In samples of large business owners and top-managers (N=21) and yoga practitioners (N=51) we found lower (d > 0.80) introspection and quasi-reflection scores, compared to the two normal samples. The results suggest that the DTR is a reliable and valid instrument for differential assessment of reflective processes.

Psychotherapeutic practice calls for creating conceptions of autonomy, which can be utilized in work with clients. This article focuses on the psychotherapeutic approach called 'existential analysis and logotherapy' and makes explicit its ideas regarding autonomy. Specifically, the three key theoretical underpinnings of understanding and development of one's autonomy are described. It is shown that existential-analytical practice is guided by the notions of 'person', dialogue/relatedness and phenomenology. The structural model of autonomy on the basis of existential analysis is discussed. It is argued that, although traditionally autonomy is strongly associated with the third fundamental motivation – the motivation to 'be oneself' – this position is insufficient for practice. Thus, the central argument of the paper is that, from a structural perspective, the most useful way to address the issue of autonomy is to consider it as the interplay of the four fundamental existential motivations, described by A. Längle. Therefore, the process of maintaining autonomy includes four different kinds of affirmation. The person says ‘yes’ to his or her subjective reality, own feelings, uniqueness and distinctiveness, and agentive presence in others and in the world. The paper also provides illustrations from psychotherapeutic practice to justify this standpoint.

The developed electronic unit (ElU) measured temporal error of computer programs and equipment used in chronometric psychological experiments. Four programs were assessed – Presentation, StimMake, VS / SiSubs, Tachistoscope TX 4.01, as well as CRT and LCD monitors with a refresh rate of 200, 120 and 60 Hz, USB-mouse with a polling rate of 1000 or 125 Hz and a standard PS / 2 keyboard. In the experiments, instead of subjects, the ElU responded to the stimulus (white box on the computer screen); the ElU has near zero (less than 1 ms) reaction time (RT_r = 0) but the reaction time measured by a program is different due to the hardware delay (RT_m > 0). Instrumental errors (means and standard deviations of RT_m) depend on the programs used and are largely due to the characteristics of the output devices displaying stimuli on the screen rather than to the characteristics of the response registration devices. For the first three Microsoft Windows-based programs the instrumental errors, depending on the equipment, range from 24 to 94 ms (for medium RT_rs) and from 2.7 to 15.4 ms (for the variance of RT_r). For the MS-DOS-based TX 4.01 mean = 12 ms, variance = 2.3 ms. In order to reduce the instrumental error in chronometric experiments, “gaming” high-frequency monitors and mice with proprietary drivers are recommended. When using powerful MS Windows connecting this equipment via USB-port for chronometric purposes is acceptable.

Sometimes we do not notice a salient object while being occupied with some attention-demanding task, a phenomenon known as inattentional blindness (IB). Nowadays the question of the origin of IB is posed in terms of the differentiation between the processes of attention and consciousness. The goal of the present study was to examine the correlates of object-based attention (SN), early visual awareness (VAN), and late-visual awareness (300 ms after the presentation) in the IB condition. Our experiment used a modified version of the method of Koivisto and colleagues (Koivisto, Kainulainen & Revonsuo, 2009). Subjects were presented with two different letter stimuli that could be masked; subjects responded either that they saw or didn’t see the target letter (in the attended or unattended field) whenever it appeared. IB was considered as a condition when subjects responded "I do not see" when the unmasked target letter was presented in an unattended field. Our study showed that in a condition of IB the correlate of object-based attention (SN) was detected in the absence of the conscious processing component (P300). This, together with the absence of the lack of verbal reporting in later stages of processing, implies that the process of early stimuli discrimination might take place.  Thus the response "I do not see" in the IB condition in our study could be associated with underachieving in the last stage of stimulus processing, which is “access consciousness”.