2004. vol. 1. No. 4

Emotional intelligence (EI) includes abilities for perceiving, understanding, and managing emotion-laden encounters. In this review, definitions of EI and relations to other concepts are discussed. Particularly important to establishing scientific credibility are measurement issues. Thus, this review covers attempts to assess EI through questionnaire and objective tests. The review also includes an evaluation of the coherence of emerging psychological theory supporting EI and its compatibility with existing ability and personality models. In addition, the practical utility of EI in applied settings is discussed. It is concluded that current evidence does not support the concept of an overarching general EI factor. However, ‘objective’ testing may uncover some competencies that are distinct from existing psychological constructs, which may be particularly useful in applied settings.

The arguments against intelligence tests that had been advanced by M. Kholodnaya are considered and criticised. It is argued that these tests explain an important part of real life success variance. To better assess the role of intelligence in life and the accuracy of intelligence tests it is proposed to evaluate parts of real life success that can be explained by the chance or non-cognitive individual variables. Critical arguments are advanced against creativity tests and experts' judgments. 

The author argues that the intelligence test debates amongst professional psychologists result from the participants’ conflicting styles of thought. At present, both extreme views – either blind belief in high validity of intelligence tests or refusal to use them because of faults in testing procedure – are unacceptable. The author criticises the explanation of practically all aspects of life (study, work, conflicts etc.) by correlation arguments. Until now, the validity of intelligence tests has not been proven: their construction has no relation to the person’s competence in various areas of life; they do not take into account the specialisation of individual abilities; they are not sensitive to the dynamics of individual development, which can be influenced by the «factor of a chance event». The use of tests raises social and ethical problems. In unprofessional hands, they are often damaging to the individual’s interests. Tests can be used providing there are all the right conditions, but not for discriminating people and, above all, children on the basis of their IQ.

The author describes four situations in which tests can be used: self-testing, consulting, development (or pedagogic purposes) and selection. Each of them sets different requirements in relation to the tests’ prognostic accuracy (the depth of the forecast) and the professional ethics of psychologists. The author suggests that many of the debated questions can be easily solved if one takes into account that some participants in the debates have in mind one kind of situation, and others have another. He justifies his positive attitude towards tests by saying that they are useful in situations when an individual ought to be tested not only for his or her own sake but also in order to protect surrounding people (for instance, before appointing a head of a company or a public body).

The author argues that tests should be used only by professionals knowledgeable in the theory and methodology of psychodiagnostics, familiar with the range of various techniques, and experienced in interpreting test results and applying them to practice. By contrast, a non-professional interpretation of test results raises unjustified expectations and doubts in the usefulness of testing. The author examines whether intelligence tests measure general intelligence or some particular aspects of cognition. She discusses some practical tasks for which intelligence tests can be useful.

The article examines the state of the art of intelligence testing in Russia and the Ukraine. It is underlined that intelligence tests measure psychometric (test) intelligence, which is different from psychological diagnosis. The author surveys recent studies of the prognostic validity of intelligence tests, and he discusses the ethics of testing procedure and teaching it to students. In conclusion, the author suggests that, to use tests efficiently and adequately, psychologists need to create a test infrastructure; this would be an important step towards progress in psychodiagnostics.

It is possible to test a person without receiving sincere answers to the questions. The article refers to two studies: 1) Instead of questionnaires, the author has used the EEG parameters. Using regression formulae, he received, as an outcome, the figures for each scale of the MMPI (cf. our article at Psikhologiia, vol. 1, № 3 (2004): 29–33). 2) Using the same regression formulae, the author was able to assess the degree of professionalism in bank employees, disregarding that some of their self-evaluations were neither sincere nor correct.

The author argues that intelligence and creativity tests have a double impact: they reveal some individual abilities while inhibiting others. He then classifies tests according to which particular individual ability they either reveal or inhibit. He suggests that the test content depends on its creator’s individuality, character and personal philosophy. He discusses some aspects of social and cognitive interaction between the author of the test and the tested subject, as well as possible sources of unbalanced test entries. In conclusion, the author argues that, although people will never be quite ready to diagnose their intellectual and creative potential, they should be aware of the danger of «suppressing the able» as a result of promoting and/or criticising testing.

The author argues in support of intelligence tests, which she sees as establishing the population norm of psychometric intelligence. Yet the use and interpretation of tests require from the user professionalism, the degree of which should be proved by certificates and monitored by the community of professionals. Intelligence tests should meet international standards for instruments of psychological measurement.

The author uses historical evidence to argue that tests are instruments of social control and not just of psychological investigation. Tests perfectly illustrate Michel Foucault’s point about the close connection between the science of psychology and technologies of control. To study a person, one needs to objectify his or her individuality and subjectivity. But, having become an object of investigation, the person becomes an object of forms of social control more subtle than violent or repressive actions but no less efficient. Reduced to figures, categories and diagnoses, a person is easier to manage and manipulate. Psychologists therefore should take into account that psychology is as much a technology of managing an individual, a part of bureaucratic practices, as a science.

It is argued that the discussions about intelligence tests reflect three different value systems. Equality value insists on that people get social success only because of their own efforts and not by the privilege of birth. At the same time scientific research shows that intelligence is highly heritable and is of a huge importance for social success. The value of practical help also sometimes contradicts both scientist and equality values when the use of intelligence tests is considered.

The author reacts to the criticism of her own 'positive programme', that is, her method of diagnostics of creative abilities, and not of creativity tests in general. She examines the arguments
against her position and attempts to clarify misunderstanding.

The author argues that, in economic models, consciousness — people’s most treasured possession that makes life meaningful — is but subject to manipulation. The economic models of social development aim at satisfying individual needs, not at making consciousness work efficiently. Psychology as a science has failed because, unable to solve important problems, it broke into many contradictory views. There is no shared psychological theory that would explain how a person could show free will. Until it becomes clear how a person makes free choice, the words about freedom, responsibility and human rights will be merely a political declaration. Yet, the author claims, psychology has made progress in studying consciousness. It has been shown that consciousness is neither a reflection of reality nor an adaptation to it. The new understanding of consciousness brings about a new approach to the organisation of social processes. We need to create social institutes that would maintain people’s ideas of themselves and of the world around them (which would make them happy) and correct misrepresentations.

The research aimed at comparing the structures of schematic knowledge, namely, the schemes of routine activity, or scripts, in the representatives of two occupations: medical doctors and software designers. It has been found that, while doctors distinguish more essential features in five scripts than the software designers do, both occupations equal in regards of non-essential features of the scripts. The author suggests the existence of occupation-specific patterns of social experience and scripts development. The results corroborate the main points of R. Schank’s theory of dynamic memory.

The author examines the influence of grandparents (the second preceeding generation) on individal differences in creativity and intelligence. Those children, in whose upbringing granmothers had a bigger part, have a higher level of creativity. The author distinguishes between two different approaches to upbringing: one by parents and the other by grandparents. Grandmothers’ positive impact on creativity can be explained by the following factors: lessening prohibitions and demands from the adults; allowing children more emotional self-expression; encouraging positive self-esteem in the child. Using the method of multiple regresion analysis, the author analyses the impact of each factor on children’s abilities.