

A NON-DIALOGIC RELATION TO THE OTHER: REGRESSION OR OPPOSITION TO DIALOGICITY

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Abstract

The study presented in this paper is focused on the development of theoretical models of the dialogic and non-dialogic nature of the personal relationship to the Other. Based on the philosophical and psychological research of the dialogue (M.M. Bakhtin, M. Buber, J. Sartre, E. Levinas, H.J.M. Hermans, T. Maranhao, M. Puchalska-Wasył, F. Rivetti Barbo, T. Zittoun), the author emphasizes the involvement of the individual in various forms of activity that, due to personal efforts, acquire a dialogical character. The “personality’s attitudes toward significances” stand out among these forms, including the relation to another significant person. The author develops an understanding of dialogue as a complete realization of the relation to the Other in the dimensions between-I-and-Other, I-in-Other, Other-in-I, and I-in-Self-with-Other. Non-dialogicity, which rarely happens to be the subject of psychological research, firstly can be defined as one of the possibilities for the formation of an attitude; secondly, as a regress of the dialogical attitude; thirdly, as a binary opposition present in the conscious plane, or “in the shade” of the dialogical dynamics of the attitude; fourthly, as a trend that conflicts with dialogicity in favour of the development of dialogue. Following the multilateral view on the genesis of dialogicity/non-dialogicity in the personality’s relation to the Other, a number of theoretical models have been developed: a model of the dialogic attitude to the significance; models of the I in the context of a dialogical attitude; the existential model of regression in the dialogicity of the I-Other relation; a model of personal prerequisites of non-dialogicity in relation to the I-Other; a model of oppositions to dialogicity in the dimensions of the I-Other relation.

Keywords: personality, I, Other, relationship, reflection, dialogue, dialogicity, non-dialogicity, regression, opposition, hermeneutics, model, theory.

Introduction

In the modern humanities the problem of dialogue is explored in the context of theories of culture and language, consciousness and text, I and intersubject relations. In philosophical and psychological sciences (in particular, in the psychology of personality) the studies are focused on dialogues of individual consciousnesses, on the dialogicity of speech and individual cognition, dialogic communication and intrapersonal dialogue, dialogue with oneself and the dialogical I of personality (Bakhtin, 1986; Buber, 1993; Sartre, 1953; Levinas, 2006;

Borisov, 1997; Kopiev, 1999; Florenskaya, 2001; Hermans, 2006–2007; Dimaggio, Salvatore, & Hermans, 2003; Maranhao, 1990; Puchalska-Wasył & Oles, 2013; Rivetti Barbo, 1983; Zittoun, 2014). The entire psychological research of personal dialogue highlights the role of the Other (of many and individual people) that has various external and internal connections with an individual. One of the research tasks is to study the involvement of the Other in various forms of the activity of personality that acquire a dialogical nature (due to an individual's own efforts and the possibilities of the Other). However, among these forms little emphasis is placed on the “personality's attitudes toward significances” including the attitude to another significant person. We believe that an individual attitude to a significant Other and multidimensionally mediated by other people can either gain or not a dialogical character under conditions that are to be discovered in fundamentally new research.

This research, in our opinion, should interpret the experience of investigating the dialogue in philosophical sciences and cultural research, with the context of psychological ideas and facts relating to individual dialogicity taken into account. The research should put the I of personality in the focus of learning the dialogical attitude to the Other, reveal **the non-dialogical nature** of the attitude as an alternative way to implement it (as compared to the dialogue). The non-dialog nature, which rarely happens to be the subject of psychological research, firstly can be studied as one of the possibilities for the formation of an attitude; secondly, as a regress of the dialogical attitude; thirdly, as a binary opposition present in the conscious plane, or “in the shade” of the dialogical dynamics of the attitude; fourthly, as a trend that conflicts with dialogicity in favour of the development of dialogue.

Following the multilateral view on the genesis of **non-dialogicity** and relying on our previous studies, we propose a concept of dialogicity/non-dialogicity of the personality's attitude to the Other that was developed using the method of theoretical modeling.

A model of the dialogic attitude to the significance.

The attitude to the Other belongs to the broadest scope of phenomena, which are psychologically designated as attitudes of personality. As related to the development and achievement of maturity, the **attitude of an individual** is an integral form of conscious life aimed at the **significance** so that the potential of the individual and the significant can be released and implemented (Starovoytenko, 2015). Attitudes constitute the process of the mental and experiential life of an individual. They define its progress and are imbued in every moment of subjective living. In this respect they are considered to be **life attitudes**. **The I** of a person (with its potential for reflexivity and self-fulfillment) is a necessary source, subject and “derivative” of the attitude. At the same time the profound self-movement of life and the spiritual transcendence of the individual to higher levels of existence are translated in the attitude.

The personality may connect with the significances through syntheses of the elements of the functional **architectonics** of the attitude. Those are the desire and experience, growth and contemplation, imprinting and remembering, thought and reflection, the intent to act and the action. The I (either explicitly or implicitly) is present in each of these elements and either reflexively or non-reflexively determines the integrity and continuity of the attitude.

The nature of significances and the architectonics enable a distinction of the **attitude types** using three groups of criteria: subject and content, structure and function, and value-based. In particular, the **subject and content criterion** defines a person's attitude to the world, to the Absolute, nature, culture, society, activity, values, other people, to individual people and to themselves. Each of these general attitudes is fulfilled in a variety of private attitudes that are oriented toward individual significances: toward specific Others, individual beings, communities, things, signs, activities, properties and ways of life of the Other, aspects of the I, etc. The **structural and functional criterion** is applied to distinguish emotional, sensory and sensuous, figurative, mental, intuitive, practical, and reflective attitudes. Religious, cognitive, ethical, aesthetic attitudes and the attitude towards oneself are distinguished according to the **value criterion**.

Diverse relationships are involved in the development and realization of each other; every relation in one's own existence provides for a multilateral co-presence of personality and significance; different relationships are combined by mutual multiplication of possibilities. For example, the attitude of the person to themselves in the aspect of appearance can be realized through developed emotional, imaginative, intuitive relationships and can be involved in the formation and potentiation of their general aesthetic relationship.

As life unfolds, the attitude to significance acquires **multi-stage dynamics** that is flexibly structured with elements of its architectonics. It has a conscious current action, the actualization of knowledge and meaning, the awareness of the "I can," the development of motivation, goal-setting, acts of choice, decision making, novel action and the evaluation of its results in terms of productivity, subjective satisfaction, as well as problematization, re-emphasis and changes in the meaning – all mutually generated and transferred into each other (Ibid.). Semantic re-emphasis determines the future active attitude of an individual to the significant in terms of possible – desired – purpose-oriented – chosen – achieved – fulfilled.

When a certain attitude is realized, the person consciously experiences an encounter with the significant; correlates himself or herself with it; puts it in relation to themselves; refers to the significant presented in themselves; refers to themselves as represented in it; refers to themselves in their connections with the significant. As an I, a person can **reflectively** relate to these moments of the attitude, develop their architectonics, find their unity thus achieving **dialogicity** in the interaction with the significant (Starovoytenko, 2017; Starovoytenko & Derbeneva, 2017).

We believe that the attitude to the significant has to undergo a few **stages** in order to attain dialogicity. Those stages are the search and the discovery of a significance as an object corresponding to strong aspirations of the individual; an

impression of the moment of meeting with the significant; the identification of own personality with the significance as coinciding with a desire; the establishment of a distance between themselves and the significance as “different;” entering into a real interaction with the significance; the awareness of oneself as truly interacting with the significance; a transfer of the significance and effects of the interaction with it in the subjective plan, therefore turning it into an “internal significance;” the person’s search for “themselves” and their active contributions in the existence and structure of the significant; own “view of themselves” from the world of the significance; real actions fulfilled by the person towards the significant that stimulate the development of its internal “equivalent” and the awareness of personal presence in it; the interaction of the individual with their inner significance when personal presence in it is realized; the individual’s view into themselves from the position of own inner interaction with the significance; the internal significance correlated with the real significance; the person’s intention to develop and correlate the significance, self-in-significance and significance-in-self; finding and managing the person’s contradictions in the external and internal interaction with the significance; the exit of the person into the world, beyond the boundaries of the established connection with the significant, where the being of the significance is largely unknown; the person’s in-self generalization of conscious moments of own external and internal interaction with the significant; the returned autonomy to oneself and to the significance, the turn into self by the completion or renewal of the interaction with it; a new discovery of the significance in the world (Starovoytenko, 2015).

The stages described realized fully or partially, possessing continuity/gaps and harmony/conflict, can define a relatively completed cycle of the dialogical attitude of an individual to the significant. In a dialogue with a significance each stage and the attitude as a whole are performed in the **measurements** of the real interaction of a person with the significance (“between”), the personality-induced effects on the significance (“in-significant”), the influence of the significant experienced by a person as well as the occurring transformation (“in-person”), the self-aggregation of the measurements of an attitude (“in-self”), the individual’s exits into the world as having become related to the significant (“in the world”). When an attitude progresses into a reflective plane, these measurements are transformed into “between-I-and-significant,” “I-in-significant,” “Significant-in-I,” “I-in-myself-with-significant,” “I-in-the-world-with-significant.” In this complex multi-dimensional space of each attitude the personality, its I and the significant can have simultaneous and alternating objectness and subjectness with a dominating personal position of the **subject**.

An individual that finds itself in relation to the significant and fully realizes and multiplies its potential, in our opinion, should possess **prerequisite properties** determining the person’s strong subjectness in the context of life. Numerous research into the subject of life shows that these properties include susceptibility to the world, the openness to subjective experience, the ability to organize the time of life, the sensitivity to the new, an intuition for destiny, intended purpose, the love of life, care towards others, commitment, initiative, intellectuality, maturity of

the I, reflexivity, dialogue ability, higher feelings, creativity, productivity, resilience, satisfaction with life, life fulfillment, and a sense of life prospects. We believe that these properties constitute a stable resource and a “fixed” intrapersonal result of a dialogical attitude from the moment of capturing, accepting and mastering a significance, to the moment of an active mental and practical interaction with it, to the moment of experiencing and reflecting on own presence in the being of the significant, to the moment of understanding and reflecting the activity of a significance in own life, to the moment of self-transformation in the connection with the significant and to the moment of discovering new possibilities of the I and the significance in the world. Being realized in an attitude, the prerequisite properties contribute to the enhancement of its resource, both in terms of its development and in the aspect of the subject person acquiring effective methods of positioning in the world beyond the boundaries of this attitude.

A subject’s property of “being the I” plays a leading role in the development and realization of the subject in relation to significance. The property can be considered as an integral of self-consciousness and a generalized effect of the personality’s dialogue with oneself that ensure the person’s self-positing in the world. **Models of the I** may be applied to justify the role of the property in the context of relationships. The models emphasize those forms or hypostases of the I that determine the self-being and interaction, reflection and self-sufficiency, cognition and creativity of an individual in relation to significant objects.

Models of the I in the context of a dialogical attitude

The first model proposed by V.A. Petrovsky (Petrovsky, 2013) consists in distinguishing a number of **successive forms of the I** that are considered as constituting continuous connections of the personality with oneself and the significance at all moments of attitudes.

The Pure I, or the individual being as such, contains in its potential the possibility of “relations” and the essential certainty of the conscious I.

The Existential I, or self, the nuclear “in-itself,” which gains (through its own existence) the fulfillment and fullness in the world. In the self-movement of life, the I comprehends the significances and their possibilities, it finds “itself” on a profound level through them and in them with all the diversity of the modes of presence and in the ability to relate.

The Phenomenal I as a unity of the general “feeling of self” in its various hypostases: of the feeling of own indivisibility, integrity, continuity, oneness with oneself (I-autotelicity); self-contemplation, the perception of the factual givenness of “oneself” to oneself, the experience of self-belonging (I-self-sufficiency); sensual self-knowledge, the deduction of oneself from the “concealed,” self-positing (self-revelation); self-reliance, self-adherence, following oneself (I-self-worth). This is the I that in its reality for-itself can become directly relevant to the significance, enter into interaction with it, while preserving itself in the autonomy and freedom of realization.

The Cogital I as an effect of the reflection of own hypostases and the knowledge acquired on the existence of unknown possibilities. It establishes and challenges the links between various aspects of the I, providing an experience of the self known by self, of self-coincidence, and own authenticity. It is the I that can mentally and imaginatively find itself in different dimensions of the relation to significance, while revealing its differences as one experiencing the impact of the significant reflected by the significant, having the significant in itself, affecting the significant, and existing self-in-itself-for-itself.

The True or Existential I as never coinciding with itself, as unable to identify with itself in reflection, as supposing and maintaining the boundaries between the I, the non-I and the I-another, as not identical to its individual hypostases, as preserving the mystery of the emergence of a given individual being and the impossibility of its full realization in the world. It is the I that in the context of any attitude to the significant is always redundant in comparison with which is consciously realized in impersonal and intrapersonal processes of the attitude, but that is also always not sufficient in comparison with the demands of new situations in which it meets with significance.

We developed the second model (Starovoytenko, 2013) to differentiate **the hypostases of the I**, with which the personality faces significance in various dimensions of the attitude.

The Profound I, or the primordial, non-designated, nonverbal, pre-reflective ego, a support for the intuitive self-identity of the personality and the “seed” of the life possibilities of the I. It is the source of the unconscious dynamics of the attitude to significance in all dimensions, which determines, for example, the mysterious super value and power of the significant over the personality in the outward and inward life.

The Corporeal I experienced and realized under the influence of the deep sensuality of the personality, the vitality it senses, the available self-perception of appearance and bodily dynamics, under the impressions of the personality about the bodies of others, affected by their views, their influences, and their direct responses to its appearance. In addition, the experience of the Corporeal I includes cultural images and ideals of the body that are identical to the personality. With others and culture involved the Corporeal I may continue externally in the dimension of wealth that eludes the person, as Sartre puts it (Sartre, 1953). By means of a socially and culturally enlarged Corporeal I the personality is involved in a real interaction with significance. It performs actions towards the significant, finds itself as acting, embodied in significance, and discovers in own corporeality and activity “traces” of the objectification of the significant.

The Reflexive I, or the Conscious I, that supposes and establishes itself as a source and center of the concentration of acts of consciousness, as a “site” of self-return, a subject of dialogue with oneself, and as a point of the integration of the I directed toward the world and “dissolved” in innumerable moments of cognition, experience and action. The I in this hypostasis can constitute and connect all dimensions of a personality’s attitude to significance by translating it into the mode of the I – Significance.

The Dialogic I, or the I that is cognizable, estimated, experienced by the personality in interaction and diverse life dialogues with significant others whom the person has discovered for themselves in culture, society, or intimate communication. It is an aggregation of those elements of the I that are generated in a joint action, in corporeal participation, in the reflection in the inner world of the specific Other, affected by the intrapersonal influence of the Other, and in the mutual contributions made to the outside world. It is the I that imparts dialogicity to own connections with any significances, while involving and revealing the presence of many other people in them. It is the I that is able to enter into various (corporeal, sensual, emotional, mental, figurative-symbolic, verbal, and action) dialogues with significance in each individual dimension of the attitude and to link them to each other by maintaining a dialogical attitude in general.

The Active I as an I capable of productive activities in the world, spiritual creativity, self-activity. It is the I that realizes the life project “to be” and “to be fulfilled in being” through the multiplication and development of values, by performing acts and deeds and improving oneself as a subject of action. The personality possessing this I directly participates in a real relation “between” itself and significance and transforms it into a complex, conscious, directed, meaningful process of productive activity towards the significant. In addition, the Active I is represented in the being of significance as one of its driving forces, and at the same time, it senses in its own inner being the subjectness of significance caused by the interaction with it. The Active I in the realization of personal relations recreates impressions of own activity, success and possibility by developing the dimension “in-itself” and generating an intention to live “in-the-world” beyond a specific relationship.

The Collective I, or the I experiencing influence and having an impact on many people. It may be partly reflected on and partly it shines through in self-consciousness as the “unknown self.” It is the I that is looked at and shares the feelings and actions of others. It experiences and comprehends the impressions of it being manifested in the environment. It identifies with the cultural images of others and becomes a source of identification for many in the creation of culture. Realizing its “dispersion” and active presence in others, the I strives to “assemble itself” but often comes across impassable places in the mysterious spaces of another’s being. In relation to significances the Collective I brings moments of positive experience acquired in partnership, intimacy, and co-creation with others about the significant; it enriches the “in-itself” dimension with responses to own existence, which emanate from others, and it also acquires, in relation to the resource of positive sociality translated by the person “into the world.”

The Designated I as one that has a verbal equivalent in the form of the “I” symbol, which acts as a cultural gift, an “instrument” that allows the person to consciously establish own presence in relation to itself, to transform conscious being “for self” into being “in self,” to fill the own I with a steady content and meaning, and to achieve self-identity. The I is a word, a name, a symbol used by a person constantly and at the same time, only once at every moment of life, when addressing the unique “self,” in the situation I-here-and-now. Being designated, the

I can comprehend its belonging to the Universal I and own individuality; it can hold its life in all mankind time, as well as in the unique moments of a personal time. In the context of the attitude to significance the I enables the maintained continuity and completeness of the reflexive dialogue with self, which can take place in any dimension of the attitude and, above all, in the “in itself” dimension.

Among an individual’s life relations the **relation of the I-Other** is distinguished where the Other is a specific significant person. The focus on this relation is relevant as it has a special importance for the development and realization of many life relations, where the connections of the I with significances are mediated by the impacting, facilitating and productive presence of another person.

It is essential that in relation to the Other self-relationship of an individual develops. This is due to the possibility of a holistic awareness of own being in an interaction with the Other in the outer world, in the inner world of the Other, in own inner world, and in the space of the I-in-itself. As Sartre points out, the I’s being-for-Other, that is an I-object, is not an image of the I inhabiting in someone else’s consciousness; this being is absolutely real, the I’s being as a condition of selfhood against the Other and the Other’s selfhood as opposed to the person (Ibid.).

When analyzing the **dialogical** unfolding of the relation I-Other, the following regularities revealed in the studies of reflected subjectness of V. A. Petrovsky can be emphasized (Petrovsky, 2010) and in our research of the possibilities of the I in relation to the Other (Starovoytenko, 2013, 2015, 2016).

- This is a conscious or intuitively experienced I activity of the Other in his inner world and own activity of the I, whose influence the Other feels and is aware of, while sharing his outward and inward life;
- Forms and modes of the I’s activity continued by the Other and in the Other that keep “traces” of its individuality and absorb the subject efforts of the Other involved in this activity;
- The spontaneous action of spiritual and active contributions of the Other that unconsciously entered into the inward and outward life of the I, or, in the words of V. A. Petrovsky, the “transformed subjectness” of the Other;
- The contributions in-itself recognized by the I when referring to the I reflected in the Other, to the I that reflects the Other, and to the I-integral of these reflections;
- The I having no knowledge of own subjectness in the Other, which is derivative of the hidden self-movement of its influences in the inward world of the Other; the existence of the unknown I in the Other;
- The discovery by the I of own activity represented in the consciousness of the Other, which embodies a massive amount of consciousnesses and self-consciousnesses and of its activity as acquired through the Other a new unknown scope and a prospect of spreading in a multitude of people.

The I-Other relation in its dialogical dynamics reproduces all the **stages** of development and realization of the attitude to significance discussed above. At the same time, in relation to the Other (as in other relations), **non-dialogic** tendencies

of the attitude can arise and manifest. We shall consider a number of conceptual models that generalize these trends and their personal conditions.

The existential model of regression in the dialogicity of the I-Other relationship

This model is developed by reconstructing the ideas of Sartre's existential concept (Sartre, 1953), which quite fully embraces the dynamics of the relationship I-Other in the direction of the regress of dialogue. We shall dwell on some general trends of this dynamics.

1. *Imparting the Other with a meaning that does not coincide with its "significance"* that consists in trying to use the Other as an object of power or a means of self-affirmation. At the same time, the possibility of the I to be significant for the Other is lost or weakened. The significance of recognizing the personality by the Other depends on the significance of recognizing the Other by the personality, as Sartre assumed (Ibid.).

2. *Failure to go through necessary cycles of mutual "negation" with the Other* in the developing attitude towards it, that means a lost ability of the I to distinguish self from the Other as an object, to experience and accept own objectness for the Other, to recognize the mutual objectness of each other in a reflexive address to self, to reveal the own I and the existence of the I of the Other in mutual denial or the assumption of objectness and the "otherness" of each other, to fulfil the freedom, or subjectness, of each in the realization of each other's opportunities. The reduction of these cycles will mean the loss of the dialogue "facing each other," the lack of reflexivity as a condition and result of the dialogical position of the I. Sartre points out that non-reflexive consciousness does not comprehend the personality directly as its object; the personality itself is represented to consciousness, because it is an object for the other (Ibid.).

3. *The corporeality and the corporeal expression of the Other ignored by the I* in the direct interaction or the former deprived of reality and factuality for itself. That is, the Other as a "synthetic unity" of the experiments of the I (facial expressions, views, deeds, actions) ceases to organize its experience of dialogicity.

4. *The I's being in the "invisibility" for the Other and for itself*, or the I's being unaware that it is seen, and the ignorance of own corporeality of the I in connection with the lack of perception of the Other's viewpoint. From the very beginning the Other's opinion is an intermediary that sends the I back to it (Ibid.). When the I slips away from the Other's view, it does not exist for itself. In this case, when the view of the Other completely masters the world of the "external I," it is impossible to get out of its position of an object-for-Other.

5. *The existence of the I for the Other and the Other for the I not as mutually recognized individualities, but as "everyone,"* sharing with many others the use of the instruments of the world, which belong to "all" and unite all in an impersonal unity. The arising non-acceptance of each other in the authenticity of being transforms the real interaction into a "shared loneliness."

6. *Lack of the I's addressing to the Other as an "object"* or a lost opportunity for the I to understand its givenness in the Other, and also to make its unknown I, given to the Other, an object of self-knowledge.

7. *Failure to understand that the Other is always multiple-valued as it embodies a multitude of consciousnesses and self-consciousnesses*, and that the givenness of the I as an object for the Other and in the Other gives this object a volume and abundance that is inaccessible to self-consciousness if it tries to get rid of the Other. The I is the way the Other knows and sees it, who has wealth that can elude from the I, but can be revealed in dialogue.

8. *The freedom of the Other not recognized*, which does not allow the I to comprehend its appearance and its actions as seen by the Other, to know itself in its unknown being in this Other, to allow the Other to equal the possibilities of the I to own possibilities for joint action, as well as to use the possibilities of the Other to master and apply objects that without it escape from the I, to recognize the value of the existence of the Other for self. The negation of the freedom of the Other arising in the relation leads the I to the restriction of own freedom.

9. *The I experiencing the danger of being an object for the Other*: of own helplessness over the unforeseen evaluations by the Other, the feeling of self as an instrument of alien possibilities and a means for the unknown goals of the Other; the feeling that the Other perceives the I in a wrong way, the I's negative evaluation of self as viewed by the Other; the feeling of the Other as a power that one does not possess, in particular as a discoverer of the secret being of the I; the fear that the Other can lose the I as an object and realize its opportunities aimed at-others.

10. *The I does not accept the risks of contacting the freedom of the Other*, which consists in rejecting "self" as seen and assessed by the Other. Usually when the Other describes the character of the I, it does not recognize itself and gets alienated, but at the same time it knows that "this is the I," without ceasing to be a "foreigner." When the I denies itself in the Other, or the alienated I disappears, it entails the disappearance of the Other through the collapse of the I itself (Ibid.).

11. *The I does not accept the responsibility for the existence of the Other*, when the I ceases to recognize the subjectness of the Other in relation to it and to itself, when it does not fulfil the possibility to give an existence to the Other in its objectness for itself, when it does not reveal a new existence of the Other in its freedom in relation to it, when it cannot establish an internal identity with the Other by continuing its assets in its own being.

12. *The I losing "itself" if its objectness is not recognized for the Other*. The I begins to reject itself as being viewed, known, and evaluated by the Other; in front of the Other it feels "stratified" and unrecognizable by itself. The I makes an attempt to slip away from the Other's sight, to hide its body and actions, to close down for evaluative statements in its address, not to look for itself in the Other. Therefore the I appears faced by emptiness, where the I could exist in-itself-for-itself.

13. *"Blindness" as a refusal to the Other in subjectivity*. This is the Other's view ignored, which turns into an object for the I; this is also the unawareness of itself in the being of the Other; this is the "absorbing" of the Other into itself without

realizing its presence and activity. The Other becomes an object among an enormous amount of objects, which the I can affect by its actions. Sartre emphasizes that the state of blindness can last for long at the whim of the personality's fundamental self-deception; it can last intermittently for many years, all life; there are people who die without suspecting anything, except for brief and terrifying insights that it was the Other (Ibid.).

14. *Temptation as self-affirmation for the I as the most significant object for the Other on the basis of its subjectivity conquered and exceeded.* On the one hand, the actions of the I point to an infinite series of real and possible actions that create for the Other its objective being and reveal its unknown being. On the other hand, the actions of the I point to the excessive density of the possible world that is given to the Other, and to the I as the only mediator in its connections and achievements in the world.

The above tendencies of non-dialogicity can arise in connection with the personality **properties**, which are prerequisites for avoiding or regressing the dialogue in relation to the Other. Such prerequisite properties can involve, for example, the insufficient strength of the I, non-reflexiveness, the love of power, the propensity for dependence, the inability of the I to combine the subjectness and the objectness of the I and others in relationships.

The model of personal prerequisites of non-dialogicity in relation to the I-Other

Personality properties that negatively affect the formation and dynamics of dialogue in relation to the Other are systematically presented in the psychoanalytic concept of Nancy McWilliams (McWilliams, 1994). They act here as "characters," or "types of adaptation."

Sociopathy: the propensity of an individual to manipulate and use others; search for one's "omnipotence" to be confirmed in the interaction with others; the avoidance of identification with others in favour of appealing to oneself in one's own desire for power and superiority. Inability to form intimate relationships; neglect of care and tenderness towards others. When another person is perceived as a useful object or object of power, the individual may seem charming and enticing.

Narcissism: excessive self-absorption at the expense of the others' significance; self-esteem achieved by attesting to own merits from others. Self-esteem is maintained through the use of other people who possess greater abilities and talents ("narcissistic expansion" of the personality); a combination of idealization and depreciation in the inner attitude to others. Strong criticism of oneself associated with the inconsistency of an "ideal" another.

Paranoid personality: the dependence of a person on a significant, authoritative another; a sense of danger due to the uncertainty of the behaviour and inner world of significant others; the conflict of the image of the I "degraded by others" in the individual's power and superiority; considering "others" as being a cause of the individual's failures; the experience of defeat in attempts to establish control over others to minimize threats on their part.

Self-destruction: the experience of “undeserved” suffering caused to the individual by the actions of significant others; the perception of oneself as a victim of persecution by others, along with a strong experience of own guilt; unconscious search in other people for the source of own “badness;” causes of low self-esteem internally redirected to others.

Obsessive-compulsive personality: formal, distant interaction of the individual with others, despite the unconscious craving for attachment; external forms of communication predominate, which are full of intellectualization and moralizing, but lack in the strength of a fulfilled life and giving value to others.

Hysterical personality: the search for protection and security in other people and the recognition of the individual’s accomplishments by them; achieving self-esteem through controlling and manipulating influences on others.

These properties, with critical levels of the expression in an individual, are the reasons for the impossibility of not only a dialogical attitude to the Other, but also of the attitude as such. When the properties are moderately expressed, the attitude and its dialogicity either remain “unfulfilled” or gain a prospect of regression.

In our studies not only the general tendencies of regression of the dialogic nature of the I-Other relationship are revealed, but also a number of specific non-dialogical tendencies are shown that arise in the dynamics of various dimensions of the attitude as an **opposition** to dialogue. They can be determined by the positions or states of the I, depend on the Other and on the reaction of the I to the Other’s attitude. We believe that the reflection and constructive actions of an individual with such oppositions can lead to the reconstruction and development of dialogue.

The reflection of non-dialogical tendencies that are specific for **different dimensions** of the I-Other relationship can be actualized in empirical research, counseling, or self-knowledge using techniques developed on the basis of the following model.

The model of oppositions to dialogicity in the dimensions of the I-Other relation

Likewise any attitude to significance, the I-Other relation acts as a unity of four dimensions: between-I-and-Other, I-in-Other, Other-in-I, I-in-self-with-Other (Starovoytenko & Derbeneva, 2017). The original “dimensional” concept of the attitude also determines a new understanding of the dialogic I’s genesis (Hermans, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2015) of an individual that complements the existing concepts.

Each dimension of the I-Other relation contains a potential for dialogue, which can be sufficiently effective even when other dimensions are not used. However, a true dialogue-relation is possible only in the completeness of their scope in a person. The oppositions to dialogicity can also be of relevance to both separate dimensions of the attitude towards the Other and their system as a whole.

We shall single out **non-dialogical tendencies**, which are relevant to each dimension of the attitude that can be discovered by individuals in reflection for their developing correction. **Reflection** can be modeled by using questions addressed to the I, to clarify how much oppositions to dialogue are inherent in its relation to the Other.

Between-I-and-Other

The I experiences and generates shortages of dialogicity and reflexivity in external interactions with the Other. The I cannot stand in the position of observation and reflection of itself in direct interaction with the Other, the I does not know how it may change in the Other's presence. In the dynamics of interaction, the I weakens the realization of its corporeal and mental abilities, or, on the contrary, shows activity at the limit of these opportunities with the threat of exhaustion. In the interaction the I unilaterally fulfills certain forms of mental activity to the detriment of other activity forms that are in demand with the interaction with the Other. The I postpones joint activity, reduces verbal communication; it does not show understanding, restrains experiences, and lends itself to unconscious affections. The I ignores the potential of the Other's direct presence in its life: the I alienates the Other's views, gestures, and utterances addressed to it.

The I decreases the assessment of outward-itself when viewed by the Other. It focuses on the Other to use and manipulate it. The I blocks the activity of the Other or "squeezes" out opportunities for itself from the Other's activities. The I underestimates the involvement and contribution of the Other in joint actions and overestimates own role in the interaction. The I ignores the value aspects of the interaction or resorts to the implementation of anti-values. The I leaves the interaction without achieving the jointly intended result and positive effects for itself and the Other. In the course of the I's activities it "loses sight" of the Other and attributes the result achieved together only to itself; it does not realize its negative influences on the Other's actions and cannot capture positive effects of the Other's activity. The I makes no account of responses to the interaction with the Other produced by the environment. The I does not take into account changes of the Other during the interaction with it.

The I feels a constant dissatisfaction with itself and with the Other in real interaction. The I faces the opposition, passivity, destructive value-semantic position, and the desire for power on the part of the Other, but gives no response. The I does not consider own changes as impacting the Other in the process of interaction. The I interacts with an imaginary but not the real Other. The I informs other people about the negative properties manifested by the Other hoping to "exclude competitors" in the struggle for closeness with or power over the Other. There are various effects of the interaction between-I-and-Other: joint failures, negative influence on the environment, destructive impact on the environment, regress of the subjects of the interaction. The apprehended "We" in the context of the interaction is perceived by the I as weaker than the participants in isolation.

I-in-Other

The I experiences difficulties in reflection when it turns to the inner world of the Other. The I is confronted with its non-representation in the Other, with the "emptiness instead of self." The I negatively experiences and assesses its non-presence in the inner world of the Other. The I grasps its presence in the Other as indistinct,

fragmentary, and situational. The I finds severe distortions of itself in the Other or understands its negative reality in it. The I reveals its low subjectness and the weak influences on the Other. The I realizes its insufficient significance for the Other. The I knows about the Other's low activity of thought, imagination, and imagination directed at it. The I experiences and reflects the distancing of the Other in its internal relation. The I is aware that it is impossible "not to be in the Other." The I seeks to master the inner world of the Other and fill it in with self. The I identifies the "inner Other" with itself and ascribes to it own vision of self. The I feels confident in its domination in the inner world of the Other and in accordance with this Other. The I projects a negative self-attitude into its own image in the Other. The I is completely identified with the I-in-the-Other. The I diminishes or idealizes itself based on the assumptions about the evaluations by the Other. The I cannot tolerate the rejection, lack of attention or undervaluation of itself in the inner world of the Other. The I cannot reflexively take its place in the Other, or the I is aware of its failure as seen from that place.

The I experiences the alienation of its image in the Other, denies the negative features of this image and replaces it with a desirable fantasy image. The I is aware of and is experiencing its values and qualities being inwardly ignored of the Other. The I feels the danger of the Other as possessing an unknown knowledge of it. The I reveals the experience of "Us" has a low inner significance for the Other. The I feels real suffering at the thought that the I does not find fulfillment and continuation in the Other. The I loses itself in the Other by recognizing the superiority and power of the latter. The I can see itself only in the image created by the Other and owned by the Other. The I ignores the opportunity to learn about itself-in-the-Other from third parties. The I alienates knowledge of its representation in the Other from real interaction with it.

Other-in-I

The I has a weak reflexive reality of the Other in-itself. The I has an indistinct, fragmentary, static, and non-reflective image of the Other. When forming its own "inner Other" the I demonstrates a one-sided domination of thought, or a fantasy, or an experience. The I does not notice changes in the inner Other caused by the dynamics of the relationship with it. The I cannot enter into an inner dialogue with the Other as an imaginary, ideal or secret interlocutor. It does not realize how it changes with the internal actualization of the image of the Other. The I attributes to the Other an inexplicable power that internally dominates, suppresses and causes fear. The I experiences and realizes an involuntary absorption by the image of the Other and internally surrenders to it. The I inwardly identifies itself with the Other, it assigns to itself the Other's significant properties, and gradually empties its image. The I feels its superiority as an owner of the inner "unknown Other." The I uses the Other as own "function" or "expansion," thus internally depriving the Other of an autonomous existence. The I is hardly aware of the activity of its "inner Other" and experiences the activity effects as a "stranger's" invasion. The I does not comprehend the value influences of its "inner Other".

The I represents the Other as its inner mirror, which reflects mainly its negative features. The I experiences attachment to the “inner Other” as a reflection of its ideal qualities. The I has negative feelings and thoughts dominating about the imagined Other. The I does not see the oneness with the Other in the phenomenon of the inner “We.” The I subjectively excludes the Other’s potential from the conditions of its development. The I establishes internal power over the Other despite the balance of power in the external interaction. The I devalues the “inner Other” as it defends itself against its extremely high significance. The I internally accepts the Other as a standard for itself that is not subject to doubt and reassessment. In its “inner Other” the I sees a critic, an inhibitor and a censor of own creative ideas. The I internally “exposes” the imagined Other and involuntarily moves towards the loss of the relation. The I imagines the Other as an elusive, mysterious significance that is not accessible to relations. The I uses the possibilities of its “outsidedness” for the Other, inwardly attributes to it dubious features and mocks it. The I does not accept the knowledge of the Other, which is owned by others. The I does not accept or uncritically accepts the image of the Other created by others. The I cannot achieve the unity of the imagined and real Other, which makes the attitude towards it dubious.

I-in-itself-with-Other

The I cannot reflexively master various dimensions of the I-Other relationship. The I is fragmentary and situationally presented to itself in the context of the attitude to the Other. The I does not create the image of an external self through the Other. The I does not address itself as its own interlocutor when defining the relation to the Other. The I cannot be itself in the presence and interaction with the Other. The I cannot enter into self-relationship in the external and internal relation to the Other. The I experiences a weakening self-acceptance, a decrease in self-esteem, an increase in mistrust and doubts in itself in the dynamics of attitudes toward the Other. The I cannot reflect and integrate its self-experiences, corporeal images of self and the knowledge about self that appear in relation to the Other. The I does not retaliate against its dependence on the Other, which is hurtful and traumatizing. The I, when identifying with the Other, either appropriates the Other’s strengths, or ascribes, or “gives away” to it its own merits. The I does not attain the “forthcoming” meaning of the Other’s presence in its life.

The I does not feel the build-up of its life possibilities in relation to the Other. The I experiences a shortage of own activity in joint activities and experiences restraint in self-expression “under the eye” of the Other. The I does not feel trust in itself, the sustainability of its intentions and progressive productivity in relation to the Other. The I avoids insights into the “unknown in self,” which emerges in the interaction with the Other. The I does not identify with the Other and loses or does not gain the experience of “We.” The I is not capable of strengthening itself, self-affirmation in the presence and in the interaction with the Other. The I cannot grasp the “possible self,” create an image of the “ideal self,” make a “draft of the I” in the context of its relationship with the Other. The I experiences a “withdrawal,”

the loss of self when the I reacts to the Other. The I ignores the images of “itself” in relation to the Other, which exist in the minds of others. The I attributes achievements and failures in the interaction with the Other only to itself. The I does not feel own changes in the dynamics of relations with the Other. The I does not understand the Other’s place in its life and experiences a strong “loneliness together.”

These non-dialogical tendencies can become a subject of reflexive **problematization of self** for the I, which leads to positive transformations of an individual’s positions in relation to the Other. On the basis of this “self-confrontation” (Hermans, 2006–2007), non-dialogicity in relation to the Other becomes a condition for the resumption of dialogue with it.

Regression and opposition to dialogue do not exhaust the influence of non-dialogicity on the I-Other relation in the context of the individual life. Sometimes non-dialogic nature can become a condition for the existence of a relationship. For example, in the experience of love situations may arise when, in order to save it, some of the most important moments of dialogicity must be **eliminated**. Intentions to dialogue paradoxically ruin love or plunge lovers into trouble.

The need to exclude dialogicity in love and the consequences of its “non-exclusion” have a cultural and psychological genesis and are represented in a variety of **archetypal and symbolic** phenomena. We shall show a few situations, when the characters in a myth should exclude dialogicity, but do not do it.

“Eliminate the view of the Other.” The phenomenon of Orpheus who violated the prohibition to look at his Beloved, which resulted in their death.

“Do not show yourself to the Other.” The phenomenon of Cupid who involuntarily showed himself to his Beloved and subjected her and their love to hard trials.

“Do not reveal the secret of the Other.” The phenomenon of Jocasta who did not escape the discovery that her beloved husband, Oedipus, is her son.

“Do not reveal your secret to the Other.” The phenomenon of Phaedra who did not preserve the truth of her love for Hippolytus and thus destroyed him and herself.

In an individual’s attitude to significance the boundary of dialogicity and non-dialogicity may be subtle and permeable. In their change, interaction and domination, conditions for development, conflict or destruction of relations are created. The personality’s reflection that captures the dynamics of relations can find creative solutions to enhance their dialogicity based on overcoming or using the hidden resource of non-dialogical tendencies.

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Недиалогичное отношение к Другому: регресс или оппозиция диалогичности

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Резюме

Исследование, представленное в данной статье, посвящено разработке теоретических моделей диалогичности и недиалогичности отношения личности к Другому. Основываясь на философских и психологических исследованиях диалога (М.М. Бахтин, М. Бубер, Ж.-П. Сартр, Е. Levinas, Н.Ж.М. Hermans, Т. Maranhao, М. Puchalska-Wasyl, F. Rivetti Barbo, Т. Zittoun), автор акцентирует вовлеченность личности в разные формы активности, которые, благодаря ее усилиям, приобретают диалогичный характер. Среди этих форм выделяются «отношения личности к значимостям», в том числе отношение к другой значимой личности. Развивается авторское понимание диалогичности отношения к Другому как полноты его реализации в измерениях между-Я-и-Другим, Я-в-Другом, Другой-в-Я, Я-в-себе-с-Другим. Недиадлогичность, крайне редко выступающая предметом психологических исследований, определяется, во-первых, как одна из возможностей становления отношения к Другому, во-вторых, как регресс диалогичного отношения, в-третьих, как бинарная оппозиция, присутствующая в сознательном плане или «в тени» диалогичной динамики отношения, в-четвертых, как тенденция, конфликтующая с диалогичностью в пользу развития диалога. В соответствии с многосторонним взглядом на генез диалогичности-недиалогичности отношения личности к Другому разработан ряд теоретических моделей: модель диалогичного отношения к значимости; модели «Я» в контексте диалогичного отношения; экзистенциальная модель регресса диалогичности

отношения Я — Другой; модель личностных предпосылок недиалогичности в отношении Я — Другой; модель оппозиций диалогичности в измерениях отношения Я — Другой.

Ключевые слова: личность, Я, Другой, отношение, рефлексия, диалог, диалогичность, недиалогичность, регресс, оппозиция, герменевтика, модель, теория.

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